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Abstract 
Recent work by Gokhale et al. (forthcoming) proposes a method for detecting misvalued stocks. This paper 
applies the method to look for profitable investment opportunities by identifying undervalued stocks. Using data 
on companies in the S&P 100 over a period of 22 years, we test several specifications of our investment strategy 
for robustness. We find that investing in undervalued stocks significantly outperforms benchmark indices over 
time, and that this strategy can lead to risk-adjusted excess returns that are positive and statistically significant.  
Keywords: investment opportunities, misvaluation, behavioral finance 
1. Introducation
The field of behavioral finance analyzes how psychological forces may influence investor decisions and cause 
market anomalies (Note 1). The literature shows how the sentiment and cognitive weaknesses of some traders 
can cause them to over or under react to fundamental information and respond to news that is unrelated to 
economic fundamentals. Traders such as these are called noise traders (De Long et al., 1990), and their behavior 
can lead to valuation bias or misvaluation in which security prices deviate from their fundamental economic 
values. When such behavioral forces are coupled with herd behavior, this can produce booms, busts, and 
inefficient financial markets. 
For advocates of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), swings in financial markets are merely responses to 
unanticipated events. Eventually, security prices must return to their fundamental values. One of the strongest 
criticisms of the behavioral finance literature is that methods which uncover misvaluation ex post have not led to 
profitable investment strategies ex ante. This position is clearly voiced by Roll (1992), (Note 2) a financial 
economist and a portfolio manager: “I have personally tried to invest money. in every single anomaly and 
predictive device that academics have dreamed up. And I have yet to make a nickel on any of these supposed 
market inefficiencies.” After reviewing the evidence, Malkeil (2011) reaches the same conclusion, indicating that 
even if arbitrage opportunities did exist ex post, “it is extraordinarily difficult to recognize such situations ex 
ante.” 
The purpose of this paper is to show how a method developed by Gokhale et al. (forthcoming) can be used to 
identify valuation anomalies and uncover profitable investment opportunities. The methodology takes an 
estimation technique that is commonly used to identify inefficiency in production and cost models, and applies it 
to finance to look for misvalued stocks. In their paper, Gokhale et al. propose an investment strategy based on 
this test for misvaluation and evaluate it using the Dow, which includes 30 stocks, over a time period of six years 
surrounding the Great Recession. In light of the common difficulty in finding profit opportunities that hold up 
over time, we investigate this investment strategy further to determine whether it can be profitable using a 
broader stock index over a longer time period. In the next section, we briefly discuss this method. In Section III, 
we use it to determine whether or not a strategy of investing in undervalued stocks can earn excess returns. We 
use a simple investment rule that can be implemented by an average investor. Our results confirm that 
persistently buying undervalued stocks using this method can lead to positive risk-adjusted excess returns. 
2. The Composite-Error Model and Valuation Bias
The composite-error model of financial returns, developed by Gokhale et al. (forthcoming), modifies the 
traditional market model to allow for over- or under-valuation by including a dual error term. In the standard 
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market model, variation in a stock’s return is explained by a combination of the variation in the overall market 
and an idiosyncratic error term specific to the individual stock. Here, a “market” portfolio containing all stocks is 
used to capture the available market information. In applications, the market portfolio is the Standard & Poor 
500 Index (S&P 500). The return of stock i at time t (ܴ௜௧) is assumed to have a linear relationship that is stable 
over time with the return on the market portfolio, (ܴ௠௧) (Note 3):  
Rit=αi+βiRmt+εit                                   (1) 
where the error term, ߝ௜௧, is typically assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean.  
The composite-error model is an extension of the market model and is distinguished by a dual error structure. In 
equation (1), market efficiency requires the error term to be white noise. Denoting the white noise associated 
with stock i at time t as ߭௜௧, where ߭௜௧	~	ܰሺ0, ߪజଶሻ, the market model sets ߝ௜௧ ൌ ߭௜௧ and assumes that there are 
no systematic biases in expected stock returns: ܧሾܴ௜௧|ܴ௠௧ሿ = ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠௧. The assumptions of the traditional 
market model hold if investors make mistakes that are uncorrelated.  
In contrast, the composite-error model allows for systematic misvaluation by including a second error term, ߤ௜௧, 
such that ߝ௜௧ ൌ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧. This second error identifies valuation bias, which can arise when traders suffer from 
systematic behavioral biases. One example is when traders base investment decisions on market trends rather 
than economic fundamentals (Note 4). If such biases causes stock i at time t to be overvalued, then ߤ௜௧ > 0. In 
this case, the stock’s returns outperform the returns that reflect economic fundamentals alone. If these biases 
cause undervaluation, on the other hand, then ߤ௜௧ < 0. An intuitively appealing assumption on the distribution of 
ߤ௜௧ is that smaller valuation errors are more common than large ones. One suitable assumption is that ߤ௜௧ is iid 
half-normal, which we use in this analysis. Other possible distributions are the truncated-normal, the exponential, 
and the gamma distributions. The traditional market model is a special case of the composite-error model in 
which there is no valuation bias: ߤ௜௧ ൌ 0 and ߥ௜௧ ൌ ߝ௜௧.  
In the absence of any valuation bias, returns will reflect the fundamental value of a security. The composite-error 
model enables us to estimate the fundamental value of a stock in year t, ܴ௜௧∗ , and thus determine whether or not a 
stock is misvalued. Over- or under-valuation is reflected in the difference between the market value and the 
fundamental value of stock returns: ߤ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ܴ௜௧∗ . Thus the expected fundamental return is 
E(Rit
*)=E(Rit-μit)=(αi+βiRmt)                               (2) 
If there is no valuation bias, then ߤ௜௧ ൌ 0 and ܴ௜௧∗ ൌ ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ߥ௜௧. Except for the unanticipated 
white-noise error term, market and fundamental values coincide. In this case, the market is efficient and the 
market model accurately captures the relationship between ܴ௜௧ and ܴ௠௧.  
If misvaluation is present, knowledge of the parameters of the composite-error model (ߙ௜, ߚ௜, and ߤ௜௧) can be 
used to estimate the fundamental value of returns. Equation (1) with a composite error term can be estimated 
using maximum likelihood. The maximum likelihood method provides estimates of ߪజଶ, ߪఓଶ, and the coefficients 
of the model and their standard errors. These results allow us to estimate ߤ௜௧ (Greene, 2008). In this paper, our 
main concern is to identify undervalued stocks. With undervaluation, ߤ௜௧ is distributed as nonpositive half 
normal, N–(0, ߪఓଶ) (Note 5). Actual returns fall short of expected fundamental returns by |ߤ௜௧| (Note 6). Notice 
that when ߪఓ → 0, the distribution collapses to a spike at zero so that ߤ௜௧ → 0. There is no undervaluation in this 
case and the market model is the correct specification. Thus, the null hypothesis of interest is ߪఓ = 0, which we 
test using a one-sided likelihood ratio test (Coelli, 1995). If the null hypothesis is rejected, then ߤ௜௧ is negative 
(i.e., ߝ௜௧ is skewed in the negative direction), implying undervaluation.  
3. Investment Strategy 
The main purpose of the paper is to determine whether one can earn excess returns by continuously investing in 
undervalued stocks, as identified by the composite-error model. We devise an investment strategy that is forward 
looking and would be accessible to the average investor. The investor uses a holding period of one year, and the 
portfolio is rebalanced at the end of each year (Note 7). The sample includes all companies that were members of 
the S&P 100 at the beginning of each year from 1990 through 2011. 
The investing and rebalancing rules are as follows.  
1) For each year from 1990 to 2010, the composite-error model is estimated for each stock in the S&P 100, using 
the daily returns for that stock. This provides a determination of which stocks in the S&P 100 were undervalued 
in each year. A stock is considered undervalued if the null hypothesis that ߪఓ ൌ 0 is rejected at either a 5% or 1% 
test size, depending on the specification (Note 8). 
2) At the beginning of 1991, $100 is distributed equally among stocks that were undervalued in 1990 (Note 9). 
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3) At the beginning of 1992, the portfolio is rebalanced by investing all proceeds equally among stocks that were 
significantly undervalued in 1991. 
4) This investment strategy is continued for each year through 2011.  
For this strategy to be profitable, two conditions must hold. First, the model must correctly identify undervalued 
stocks. Second, the market must correct the misvaluation. Of course, with superior foresight and the ability to 
identify market turning points, a better strategy would be to (1) invest in stocks that are favored by noise traders 
and becoming overvalued and (2) short-sell overvalued stocks and buy undervalued stocks just before market 
corrections take place. Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately predict market turning points. This highlights 
why our investment strategy is more realistic—it requires limited forecasting ability and capitalizes on the fact 
that prices will ultimately converge to their fundamental values. 
To evaluate the success of this investment strategy, we perform several comparisons. First, we compare investing 
in the portfolio of undervalued stocks with the performance of investing in the S&P 500, the Dow, and the 
1-month Treasury Bill (T-Bill). The S&P 500 and the Dow are standard stock market indices, and the return on 
T-Bills approximates the risk free rate of return. Our baseline specification assumes that all dividends are 
retained and not reinvested by the investor. Second, we perform the same comparison when stock dividends are 
reinvested in the appropriate portfolio of stocks (i.e., our undervalued stocks, S&P 500 stocks, and Dow stocks). 
To assure that dividends are correctly measured for the market indices, we use indices for the exchange-traded 
funds (ETF): S&P-500 ETF (SPY), which started in 1993, and Dow ETF (DIA), which started in 1999. 
In the third method used to evaluate the performance of our investment strategy, we control for risk by 
estimating our portfolio’s risk-adjusted excess return. To control for risk, we calculate the mean value of 
risk-adjusted excess returns (ܴܺ௧) for our portfolio at the end of each year. For stock i, ܴܺ௜௧ = ൫ܴ௜௧ െ ௙ܴ௧൯ െ
ߚመ௜ሺܴ௠௧ െ ௙ܴ௧ሻ, where ௙ܴ௧ is the risk free rate of return (the return on a 1-month Treasury Bill) and ߚመ௜ሺܴ௠௧ െ
௙ܴ௧ሻ is the risk premium. The ߚመ௜	for stock i in year t is estimated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
using daily returns ܴ୧୲	for the same year (Note 10). In a fully efficient financial market, arbitrage will force ܴܺ୧୲ 
to zero. If the average ܴܺ୧୲ for all stocks in our portfolio is positive and significantly different from zero, then 
our investment strategy earns excess risk-adjusted positive returns over the sample period. 
These methods require data on individual stocks of firms that were members of the S&P 100 and data on the 
S&P 500, SPY, the Dow, DIA, and the T-Bill. Relevant data are obtained from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices, Wharton Research Data Service at www.wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu.  
4. Returns from Investing in Undervalued Stocks  
Table 1 summarizes the results from the composite-error model of undervaluation, listing the number of firms 
that were significantly undervalued at the 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels for each year. On average, 
there were slightly fewer than 19 firms undervalued at the 5% significance level per year during the sample 
period, with a range from 8 to 37 firms in a given year. The number of firms undervalued at a 1 percent 
significance level ranged from 3 to 24 firms, averaging 12.6 firms per year. Interestingly, the number of 
undervalued stocks increased around the recessionary periods of 2001 and 2008. These are periods in which both 
noise traders and rational traders might be expected to shy away from the stock market, leading to 
undervaluation that would be corrected by the market over time.  
The success of the baseline specification of our investment strategy can be seen in Table 2, which lists 
cumulative returns from choosing various investment strategies. An investment of $100 in T-Bills in 1990 would 
be worth just over $210 in 2011. This implies that the risk-free return over this time period was about 210 
percent. A $100 investment in the S&P 500 or the Dow would be worth approximately $381 and $415, 
respectively, at the end of the sample period. Because the Dow includes only 30 stocks, making it more risky 
than the S&P 500, it is not surprising that the average return is higher for the Dow.  
The last two columns of Table 2 clearly indicate that investing in undervalued stocks earns greater returns than 
any of the benchmark portfolios. Investing $100 in stocks that were undervalued at the 5-percent level of 
significance was worth approximately $676 in 2011, while investing in the portfolio of stocks undervalued at 
1-percent significance resulted in $506. This is an indication that our investment strategy is correctly identifying 
companies that are undervalued, and that the misvaluation is driven out over time. The gains from investing in 
the portfolio of stocks undervalued at 5-percent significance are an additional 83 percent of what would have 
been earned by investing in the Dow over the same time period.  
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Table 1. The number of undervalued stocks and the average Fundamental Valuatino Index (FVI) for undervalued 
stocks 
Number of Firms 
5% Significance 1% Significance 
1990 15 12 
1991 8 8 
1992 14 11 
1993 14 12 
1994 10 7 
1995 8 4 
1996 15 8 
1997 11 8 
1998 11 3 
1999 12 10 
2000 20 16 
2001 37 24 
2002 33 21 
2003 24 17 
2004 18 15 
2005 24 13 
2006 27 20 
2007 15 14 
2008 26 15 
2009 21 8 
2010 24 16 
2011 26 16 
Average 18.77 12.64 
 
Table 2. Cumulative Returns from Investing in T-Bills, the S&P 500, the Dow, and in Undervalued Stocks, 
1990–2011 
Undervaluation Investment Strategy 
T-Bills S&P 500 Dow 5% Significance 1% Significance 
1990 100 100 100 100 100 
1991 107.68 126.31 92.9 138.34 134.13 
1992 113.61 131.95 112.89 126.55 122.7 
1993 117.47 141.25 117.76 135.23 125.42 
1994 120.88 139.08 133.68 142.86 131.52 
1995 125.57 186.52 136.59 181.86 171.67 
1996 132.52 224.32 184.24 210.54 193.07 
1997 139.33 293.87 229.26 253.29 246.17 
1998 146.41 372.25 283.44 313.95 268.28 
1999 153.42 444.93 326.82 423.94 317.23 
2000 160.41 399.82 404.16 440.1 311.25 
2001 169.65 347.67 378.85 444.06 326.91 
2002 176.06 266.43 358.46 364.72 275.94 
2003 178.93 336.72 306.3 481.4 358.69 
2004 180.75 367 370.44 546.12 407.16 
2005 182.92 378.02 381.81 577.15 422.39 
2006 188.34 429.5 386.01 691.96 495.19 
2007 197.36 444.66 443.91 703.72 508.69 
2008 206.58 273.53 464.17 457.97 327.57 
2009 209.63 337.68 321.5 636.4 451.75 
2010 209.83 380.85 376.63 691.44 531.83 
2011 210.09 380.84 415.31 675.78 505.94 
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To investigate the robustness of these findings, we consider two variations on the undervaluation investment 
strategy. One concern with Table 2 is that it ignores dividends. If our investment strategy identifies stocks that 
pay proportionally lower dividends than the S&P 500 and the Dow, then investing in stocks that are deemed 
undervalued by the composite-error model may be an inferior strategy. Our second specification addresses this 
issue by assuming that investors reinvest all dividends at the next rebalancing period. These returns are 
compared to those from investing in the ETF funds, SPY and DIA, with dividends reinvested in the same manner. 
Due to data availability, the time frame for this strategy is slightly shorter. Table 3 reports the results for 
investing in SPY and our investment strategy from 1993 to 2011, and Table 4 lists the results for SPY, DIA, and 
our investment strategy from 1999 to 2011. Both tables demonstrate that our investment strategy is relatively 
more profitable when dividends are reinvested. In Table 3, the 5-percent significance undervaluation portfolio 
now ends with $745, compared to a $100 investment in the SPY, which is worth $373. Over the shorter time 
period in Table 4, the 5-percent portfolio ends at $208, compared to the DIA, which is worth $139. In general, 
since including dividends improves the relative performance of our investment strategy above the baseline 
specification, we can see that stocks that were identified as undervalued paid out above average dividends.  
 
Table 3. Cumulative returns with dividends from investing in T-Bills, the SPDR S&P 500 exchange traded fund 
(SPY), and in undervalued stocks, 1993–2011 
 Undervaluation Investment Strategy 
 T-Bills SPY 5% Significance 1% Significance 
1993 100 100 100 100 
1994 103.88 101.16 107.88 106.91 
1995 109.63 140.06 140.79 141.42 
1996 115.27 169.95 167.09 162.7 
1997 121.12 227.07 206.61 211.8 
1998 126.92 289.59 261.48 233.89 
1999 132.7 345.7 357.78 280.54 
2000 140.34 309.72 379.85 282.13 
2001 145.65 281.17 398.26 309.65 
2002 148.02 225.24 336.49 268.54 
2003 149.53 279.07 452.46 355.71 
2004 151.33 307.26 521.54 410.6 
2005 155.81 329 561.73 434.75 
2006 163.27 373.34 688.76 519.81 
2007 170.9 389.75 709.89 540.37 
2008 173.42 257.18 471.51 355.49 
2009 173.59 319.39 670.42 498.02 
2010 173.8 364.33 747.9 600.02 
2011 173.87 372.87 745.19 581.44 
 
The final step in our analysis is to determine whether or not the excess returns from our investment strategy 
simply result from greater risk. The risk premium associated with investing in our portfolio of stocks is based on 
beta estimates using the CAPM. If financial markets are efficient, risk-adjusted returns in excess of the risk free 
rate	will be zero. Assuming that EMH holds, ܴܺ is normally distributed with zero mean. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is that the mean of XRit, θXR, equals 0; the alternative hypothesis is that our investment strategy earns 
nonzero excess returns: θXR ≠ 0.  
Our results indicate that the investment strategy does generate excess returns that are significantly greater than 
zero. For the portfolio of stocks that are undervalued at a 5-percent significance level, the mean value of 
estimated excess returns over the sample period is 4.52 percent per year. This mean is significantly different 
from zero at all conventional test sizes, with a p-value of 0.004. The portfolio of stocks that are undervalued at a 
1-percent significance level have a mean of estimated excess returns of 3.52 percent. This average is 
significantly different from zero at a 5-percent test size, with a p-value of 0.04. These results are based on beta 
estimates that derive from data from the current investment period (Note 11). 
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Table 4. Cumulative returns with dividends from investing in T-Bills, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY), the SPDR 
Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF (DIA), and in undervalued stocks, 1999–2011 
Undervaluation Investment Strategy 
T-Bills DIA SPY 5% Significance 1% Significance 
1999 100 100 100 100 100 
2000 105.76 95.13 89.6 106.2 100.6 
2001 109.75 91.54 81.34 111.35 110.41 
2002 111.55 79.78 65.16 94.08 95.75 
2003 112.68 98.37 80.74 126.5 126.84 
2004 114.03 103.18 88.89 145.81 146.41 
2005 117.41 106.27 95.18 157.05 155.02 
2006 123.03 124.54 108.01 192.56 185.35 
2007 128.78 133.4 112.76 198.47 192.68 
2008 130.68 95.05 74.4 131.83 126.76 
2009 130.81 114.21 92.4 187.44 177.58 
2010 130.97 128.74 105.4 209.1 213.95 
2011 131.02 139.94 107.87 208.34 207.32 
 
All of the evidence supports the conclusion that the composite-error model can identify anomalies in financial 
markets and can be used to identify undervalued stocks and earn excess risk-adjusted returns in the long run 
(Note 12). 
5. Conclusion 
According to the behavioral finance literature, the behavioral biases of investors can cause security prices to 
deviate from their fundamental values for a considerable length of time. In this study, we show how the 
composite-error model can identify undervalued stocks and be used to develop an investment strategy that earns 
excess risk-adjusted returns.  
Our empirical evidence supports two conclusions. First, estimates from the composite-error model confirm that a 
considerable number of S&P 100 stocks were undervalued during the 1990–2011 period. Second, we show how 
this information can be exploited to earn abnormal returns in the stock market. We develop a strategy that can be 
followed by an average investor, where annual investments are made in undervalued stocks. For the 1990–2011 
period, this investment strategy substantially outperformed investing in the S&P 500 and Dow indices. The 
evidence also shows that excess risk-adjusted returns from this investment strategy were significantly greater 
than zero during this time period. 
In addition to revealing opportunities for profit, widespread use of the composite-error model can contribute to 
social welfare. Both rational and behaviorally biased traders will benefit from being able to better identify when 
a security is misvalued, knowledge that may cause prices to more closely approximate their fundamental values 
(Note 13). In addition, an ability to better estimate the degree of valuation bias in various markets can help the 
Federal Reserve meet its goal of fostering a more stable financial system. 
Acknowledgements  
We wish to thank Rolf Färe, Todd Pugatch, and Carol Tremblay for helpful comments on an earlier version of the 
paper. The investment strategy that is discussed in this paper is patent pending with the U.S. Patent Office, patent 
application number 61/696800. 
References 
Abreu, D., Markus, K., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2003). Bubbles and crashes. Econometrica, 71(1), 173–204. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00393  
Aigner, D. J., Knox, L. C. A., & Schmidt, P. (1977). Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production 
function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(77)90052-5  
Akerlof, G. A., & Shiller, R. J. (2010). Animal spirits: How human psychology drives the economy, and why it 
matters for global capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 1–33. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262109 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 4; 2014 
153 
Allen, F., & Gorton, G. (1993). Churning bubbles. Review of Economic Studies, 60, 813–836. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2298101 
Allen, K., & Sturcke, J. (2010, February 23). Timeline: Toyota’s recall woes. The Guardian. 
Avery, C., & Zemsky, P. (1998). Multidimensional uncertainty and herd behavior in financial markets. American 
Economic Review, 88(4), 724–748. 
Bailey, R. E. (2005). The economics of financial markets. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817458 
Balvers, R., Wu, Y., & Erik, G. E. (2000). Mean reversion across national stock markets and parametric 
contrarian investment strategies. Journal of Finance, 55(2), 745–772. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00225  
Barber, B. M., Odean, T., & Zhu, N. (2009). Systematic noise. Journal of Financial Markets, 12(4), 547–569. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2009.03.003  
Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2005). A survey of behavioral finance. In R. H. Thaler (Ed.), Advances in Behavioral 
Finance (pp. 1–78). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2003). A survey of behavioral finance. In G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. M. 
Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance (pp. 1051–1121). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. (1995). Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 111(1), 75–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118511  
Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 80, 511–529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011  
Bhagat, S., & Romano, R. (2002a). Event studies and the law: Part I: Technique and corporate litigation. 
American Law and Economics Review, 4(1), 141–168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/4.1.141  
Bhagat, S., & Romano, R. (2002b). Event studies and the law: Part II: Empirical studies of corporate law. 
American Law and Economics Review, 4(2), 380–423. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/4.2.380  
Biais, B., Glosten, L., & Spatt, C. (2005). Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical 
results, and policy implications. Journal of Financial Markets, 8, 217–264. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2004.11.001 
Black, F. (1986) Noise. Journal of Finance, 41(3), 529–543. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04513.x  
Blume, L., Easley, D., & O’Hara, M. (1994). Market statistics and technical analysis: The role of volume. 
Journal of Finance, 49(1), 153–181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04424.x  
Boudoukh, J., Feldman, R., Kogan, S., & Richardson, M. (2012). Which news moves stock prices? A textual 
analysis. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper.  
Brooks, R. M., Patel, A., & Su, T. (2003). How equity market responds to unanticipated events. Journal of 
Business, 76(1), 109–133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/344115 
Bunkley, N. (2010, January 21). Toyota issues a 2nd recall. The New York Times. 
Coates, J. (2012). The hour between dog and wolf: Risk taking, gut feelings and the biology of boom and busts. 
New York, NY: Penguin Press. 
Coelli, T. (1995). Estimators and hypothesis tests for a stochastic frontier function: A Monte Carlo analysis. 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 6(3), 247–268. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01076978  
De Bondt, W., Muradoglu, G., Shefrin, H., & Staikouras, S. K. (2008). Behavioral finance: Quo vidis? Journal of 
Applied Finance, 19(Fall/Winter), 1–21. 
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., & Waldmann, R. J. (1990). Noise trader risk in financial markets. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98(4), 703–738. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261703 
DeMarzo, P. M., Kaniel, R., & Kremer, I. (2008). Relative wealth concerns and financial bubbles. Review of 
Financial Studies, 21(1), 19–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm032  
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The Journal of Business, 38(1), 34–105. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/294743 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 4; 2014 
154 
Fama, E. F. (1991). Efficient capital markets: II. The Journal of Finance, 46(5), 1575–1617. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x  
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. The Journal of Finance, 49(3), 
283–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00026-9 
Färe, R., & Grosskopf, S. (2003). New directions: Efficiency and productivity. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Farmer, J. D., & Lo, A. W. (1999). Frontiers of finance: Evolution and efficient markets. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 96(18), 9991–9992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.18.9991  
Fluck, Z., Malkiel, B. G., & Quant, R. E. (1997). The predictability of stock returns: A cross-sectional simulation. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(2), 176–183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003465397556764  
Friedman, M. (1953). The case for flexible exchange rates. In Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago, IL: 
Chicago University Press. 
Gokhale, J., & Tremblay, V. J. (2013). Toyota’s accelerator pedal recall and stockholder wealth. Department of 
Economics, Oregon State University. 
Gokhale, J., Tremblay, C. H., & Tremblay, V. J. (forthcoming). Misvaluation and behavioral bias in financial 
markets. Journal of Behavioral Finance. 
Greene, W. H. (2008). The economic approach to efficiency analysis. In H. O. Fried, C. A. K. Lovell, & S. S. 
Schmidt (Eds.), The Measurement of Productive Efficiency and Productivity Growth (pp. 92–250). New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183528.003.0002 
Grossman, S. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. American 
Economic Review, 70(3), 393–408. 
Harrison, J. M., & Kreps, D. M. (1978). Speculative investor behavior in a stock market with heterogeneous 
expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92(2), 323–336. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884166  
Jegadeesh, N., & Titman, S. (1993). Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for stock market 
efficiency. Journal of Finance, 48(1), 65–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04702.x 
Jensen, M. C. (1978). Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 
6(2/3), 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244159  
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of employment, interest and money. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace 
and World Inc. 
Krugman, P. (2009, September 2). How did economists get it so wrong? The New York Times. 
Kumbhakar, S., & Knox Lovell, C. A. (2000). Stochastic frontier analysi. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174411 
Kumbhakar, S., Baardsen, S., & Lien, G. (2012). A new method for estimating market power with an application 
to norwegian sawmilling. Review of Industrial Organization, 40(2), 109–129. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-012-9339-7  
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53(6), 1315–1335. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1913210 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Contrarian investment, extrapolation, and risk. Journal of 
Finance, 49(5), 1541–1578. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x 
Lo, A. W. (2004). The adaptive markets hypothesis: Market efficiency from an evolutionary perspective. Journal 
of Portfolio Management, 30, 15–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2004.442611 
Lo, A. W. (2007). Reconciling efficient markets with behavioral finance: The adaptive markets hypothesis. 
Journal of Investment Consulting, 7(2), 21–44. 
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997, March). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 
13–39. 
Madhavan, A. (2000). Market microstructure: A survey. Journal of Financial Markets, 3, 205–258. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1386-4181(00)00007-0 
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(1), 59–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003321164958  
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 4; 2014 
155 
Malkiel, B. G. (2011). The efficient market hypothesis and the financial crisis. Working Paper, Princeton 
University. 
Meeusen, W., & Van Den Broeck, J. (1977). Efficiency estimation from cobb-douglas production functions with 
composed error. International Economic Review, 18(2), 435–444. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2525757 
Poterba, J. M., & Summers, L. H. (1988). Mean reversion in stock prices: Evidence and implications. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 22(1), 27–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90021-9  
Roll, R. (1992). Volatility of U.S. and Japanese stock markets: A symposium. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 25–35.  
Scheinkman, J., & Xiong, W. (2003). Overconfidence and speculative bubbles. Journal of Political Economy, 
111, 1183–1219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/378531 
Schwert, G. W. (2003). Anomalies and market efficiency. In G. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. Stulz (Eds.), 
Handbook of the economics of finance (pp. 939–974). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 2003. 
Shefrin, H. (2013). Asset pricing and behavioral economics. In H. K. Baker & G. Filbeck (Eds.), Portfolio 
Theory and Management (pp. 73–95). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199829699.003.0004 
Shiller, R. J. (2003). From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(1), 83–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003321164967  
Shleifer, A., & Summers, L. H. (1990). The noise trader approach to finance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
4(2), 19–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.2.19  
Stigitz, J. E. (1990). Symposium on bubbles. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(2), 13–18. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.2.13  
Taylor, A. (2007, March 7). America’s best car company. Fortune.  
Thaler, R. H. (1999). The end of behavioral finance. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(6), 12–17. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/faj.v55.n6.2310 
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2004). Perspectives on behavioral finance: Does ‘Irrationality’ disappear with wealth? 
Evidence from expectations and actions. In M. Gertler & K. Rogoff (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
2003 (Vol. 18, pp. 139–208). MIT Press. 
Waldman, D. M. (1982). A stationary point for the stochastic frontier. Journal of Econometrics, 18(2), 275–279. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(82)90041-0 
 
Notes 
Note 1. For reviews of this literature, see Fama (1998), Thaler (1999), Barberis and Thaler (2003, 2005), Shiller 
(2003), Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), De Bondt et al. (2008), Barber et al. (2009), Akerlof and Shiller (2010), and 
Shefrin (2013). 
Note 2. Thaler (1999, 14) makes a similar argument.  
Note 3. For a review of the market model and a discussion of its use in event studies, see MacKinlay (1997) and 
Bhagat and Romano (2002a, 2002b). Returns of stock i in period t (Rit) are defined as the percentage change in 
the stock price plus dividends per share (dit): R୧୲ ൌ 	୮౟౪ି୮౟౪షభାୢ౟౪୮౟౪షభ . 
Note 4. Although we argue that the primary source of bias is noise trading, misvaluation can also arise, for 
example, when top management deceives traders by manipulating the reported earnings of a company 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).  
Note 5. If there is overvaluation, ߤ௜௧ would be distributed as nonnegative half normal, N+(0, ߪఓଶ). For further 
discussion, see Gokhale et al. (forthcoming). 
Note 6. That is, with undervaluation ܧሺܴ௜௧∗ ሻ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ߤ௜௧ and ܴ௜௧ ൌ ܧሺܴ௜௧∗ ሻ ൅ ߤ௜௧, where ߤ௜௧ < 0. 
Note 7. According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), it is natural for investors to re-evaluate their portfolios once a 
year, since they receive comprehensive mutual fund reports and pay income taxes once a year. 
Note 8. Stocks that were traded for fewer than 15 trading days were excluded from the sample.  
Note 9. Of course, rational traders could use a more sophisticated method, one that includes fundamental 
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economic information about firm and market characteristics, something that we ignore. We implicitly assume 
that the initial investment is sufficiently large to avoid integer problems.  
Note 10. For a discussion of this procedure, see Bailey (2005). We also consider beta estimates from the previous 
year, which we discuss shortly.  
Note 11. If we estimate the risk premium based on data from the year prior to the investment period, the 
estimated annual mean excess returns equal 3.44 (2.48) percent for stocks that are undervalued at 5-percent 
(1-percent). Only the first estimate is significantly different from zero, with a p-value of 0.04 (0.16) for stocks 
that are undervalued at 5-percent (1-percent). However, the estimated excess return from the 1-percent portfolio 
is significantly different from zero at a test size of 10% if we consider a one-sided alternative that our investment 
strategy generates positive excess returns: θXR > 0. 
Note 12. This ignores that fact that transaction costs would diminish returns from our investment strategy. 
Nevertheless, our investment strategy remains profitable even if we assume generous transaction costs, as 
assumed by Fluck et al. (1997). Of course, transaction costs would be substantially lower today with the 
availability of internet trading. 
Note 13. For example, Schwert (2003) found that when a new method uncovers profit opportunities, these 
opportunities quickly dissipate once the method become common knowledge. 
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